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Abstract
Our paper is a rst attempt to evaluate the long run impact of reference pricing
on pharmaceutical innovation, health and expenditures. The model is based on a
dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical rms, consumers
and a regulatory entity. Pharmaceutical rms choose the level of research in-
vestment and its innovative content, then negotiate introductory prices for new
drugs with the regulator. Reference pricing a¤ects negatively the intensity of
research and it also modies the types of innovations that are brought to the
market, detering small innovations. The model is calibrated with a small data
on statin in France. Our results suggest that reference pricing typically generates
a decline in health, whereas discounted expenditures may decrease or increase,
depending on to the degree of deterence of cost reducing innovations.
Keywords: innovation, me-too, reference pricing, pharmaceutical labora-
tories.
Jel codes: I18, L11, L15, L51.
1 Introduction
A dramatic increase of pharmaceutical expenditures has been observed in most
developed countries during the two last decades. In United States for example,
spending on outpatient care grew by 17 percent in 1999 whereas total health
expenditure only grew by 3.3 percent during the same year (Danzon and Pauly,
2002). Over the last years, several countries - such as Germany, Italy or Aus-
tralia - have tried to reduce health expenditure by adopting the principle of
drug reimbursement based on therapeutic equivalence, a system referred to as
therapeutic reference pricing.1 While modalities vary, the common feature of
reference pricing regulations is that drugs are divided into di¤erent classes ac-
cording to their active agents and/or their indications. Drugs reimbursement to
the patient is then dened by class, based on a reference price, set according to
some domestic prices, usually with greater weight on low prices.2 In the short
run, the product space is given and reference pricing mechanically generates a
fall in drug reimbursement and prices. Still, in a dynamic environment, where
innovation by pharmaceutical rms is driven by the prospect of future prots,
the impact of such a regulation is far from being obvious.
In a static framework, Brekke et al (2007) emphasizes the e¤ect of di¤erent
reference pricing modalities on the laboratoriesprotability and consequently
on new drugsentry likelyhood. By contrast, our paper is a rst attempt to
evaluate the long run equilibrium impact of reference pricing on pharmaceutical
innovation, delays of introduction, health and expenditures. As expected, by
reducing protability, reference pricing regulations a¤ect negatively the intensity
of research and delay the introduction of new drugs. We point out that they
also modify the types of innovations that are brought to the market due to
a di¤erential e¤ect on the prices of drugs at various innovative levels. The
regulation may then divert resources from low margin / low innovation research
projects toward higher margin projects.3 Based on the theoretical analysis
and results of calibrated simulations, we emphasize mechanisms that were not
understood before, showing that one has to be very cautious when predicting the
impact of reference pricing on the long run, in particular for drug expenditures.
The analysis is conducted in a typical continental European context, where
health insurance coverage is very high and where regulators have a strong degree
of control over the retail prices of drugs. For this purpose we build a dynamic
model of the pharmaceutical sector, inspired partly by the French system.4 The
model involves three types of actors: producers (pharmaceutical rms), con-
sumers (patients) and a regulator. Producers choose their R&D investment in
1See Lopez-Casanovas and Puig-Junoy (2000), Danzon (2001) and Danzon and Ketcham
(2004) for more details on reference pricing and its applications.
2This is referred as internal reference pricing, as opposed with external reference pricing
which relies on foreign prices.
3The fact that reference pricing may alter the innovation process in favor of pioneer
drug, is mentioned in Lopez-Casasnova and Puig-Junoy (2000).
4As will be discussed later, our model can be translated to the US market context where
Health Plans plays the role of the regulator.
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order to maximize their prot, anticipating future price and market sales dy-
namics. Moreover, laboratories can choose between two types of innovation:
vertical innovation (or pioneer) and horizontal one (also called me-too). Drug
pricing, which plays a key role in the model, results from a bargaining game
between the producers and the regulator who accounts for consumerswelfare.
The resulting introductory price acts as a price-cap and depends on the inno-
vative content of the drug and on the average prices of drugs already present
on the market. Thus, although prices are individually negotiated with the reg-
ulator, they are subject to some form of competitive pressure: the presence of
competing drugs limits the ability of an innovator to extract rents.
Even though the structure of the bargaining game is exogenous, the out-
come may be a¤ected by regulations that modify the reimbursement rules for
patients and thus nal market prices, such as reference pricing. We dene a
therapeutic class as the set of drugs that are horizontally di¤erentiated and an-
alyze the impact of reference pricing on the outcome of the bargaining process
and the equilibrium. The direct e¤ect of such a regulation is that the prices of
innovations within existing classes (me-too drugs) are pushed down compared
to the case with no reference pricing. The introduction of me-too drugs is then
delayed or even discouraged. The impact on the protability of a pioneer drug
is ambiguous: on one hand the duration of its monopoly position increases5 ,
on the other hand the competition after entry of a me-too is intensied. The
overall e¤ect depends on the combination of the price and long-run e¤ects on
innovation. To evaluate this e¤ect we calibrate the model on the market for sta-
tins: we conclude that while the patientshealth is always hurt, the discounted
value of health expenditures may increase or decrease.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, describ-
ing successively the retail market, the bargaining framework (with and without
reference pricing) and the innovation sector. In order to address technical dif-
culties progressively the paper rst focuses, in sections 3 and 4, on the case
where all innovations occur within the same class. More precisely, section 3
discusses the price dynamics and Section 4 the innovation trajectories. Section
5 extends the analysis to the case where two verticaly di¤erentiated therapeu-
tic classes are considered. Section 6 discusses welfare consequences. Section 7
briey presents the market for statins in France, that served to calibrate the
model, and exposes the results from numerical simulations. Section 8 discusses
some extensions of the model. Section 9 concludes.
2 The base model
The model involves three types of actors that intervene at di¤erent stages in a
continuous time set-up: innovators/producers, the regulator and patients/doctors.
At the upstream stage, innovators invest in R&D and introduce new molecules or
treatments. At the downstream stage, the regulatory agency and the producers
5Or its e¤ective patent life (ODonoghue et al, 1998).
2
negotiate the introductory price, and the couple patient/doctor determines the
consumption of drugs. All this is done under the legal rules that have been set
by the legislator, in particular the reference pricing system. In the benchmark
case, the legal rule is simply that the price is negotiated at the introduction
stage, and then remains constant.6
In most european countries, individuals have a high insurance coverage. We
assume in the paper that patients benet from full insurance coverage.7 Never-
theless, we relax this assumption in Section 8.
To keep in line with the standard backward analysis, we rst describe the
downstream agents and activities. Then we give details on the innovation stage.
2.1 The retail market
We focus on the case of a single pathology that can be treated with one of
several available drugs. At each instant in time there is a population of size 1
of patients to be treated. We take account of patientsheterogeneity with re-
spect to the treatments by assuming that the e¤ect of a given medication varies
among patients in terms of e¢ ciency, tolerance and side e¤ects. A therapeutic
class is a set of drugs that can be used to treat the pathology, and such that
none unambiguously dominates the others, i.e. drugs are horizontally di¤eren-
tiated. This does not mean that the drugs inside a given class are all perfectly
substitutable, but that in the absence of any specic information on the patient,
a doctor would be indi¤erent between prescribing one or the other drug in the
class. In other terms, each one has an equal chance to be e¤ective. After exam-
ination of the patient, the doctor reaches an objective diagnostic which allows
him to know what is the most adapted treatment.8 We consider here a relation
of perfect agency between the patient and the physician. They are therefore
viewed as a single agent, the consumer.9
Concerning the drugs consumed, we consider both vertical and an horizontal
di¤erentiation. Vertical di¤erentiation is dened by levels (therapeutic classes).
In order to simplify as much as possible the analysis, we assume that there are
two levels indexed by j = C or N; designing respectively current and new, and
6The model is directly inspired by the French regime of administrated prices. Each new
drug goes through three rounds before being introduced on the market: approval, evaluation
of the therapeutic value of the drug, price decision. Each round is conducted by a separate
body. The price of new drugs eligible for public insurance is xed by the Comité économique
des produits de santé (CEPS). According to CEPS, the key elements are the improvement of
medical service and the prices of drugs with similar therapeutic usage.
7 In France for example, patients are covered by the compulsory public insurance under a
copayment rule, and most of them also benet from complementary health insurance (only
8% of the people are not covered). The resulting e¤ective rate of insurance is very high at the
drug level. That makes acceptable the full reimbursement hypothesis.
8This assumption is related to the concept of ex-post di¤erentiation as for instance in
Gal-Or (1997 and 1999).
9With this assumption, we ignore two aspects with opposite e¤ects: the so-called induced
demand and the fact that physicians are incentivized by health authority and insurers to ac-
count for cost. Relaxing these assumptions may also allow to leave some room for advertising,
both informative (see Brekke and Kuhn, 2006) and persuasive (Hurwitz and Caves [1988]).
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that there are at most two drugs active in each level, i = 1 or 2. We adopt
a discrete choice model to represent the utility from consumption.10 When
consuming drug i in level j, a patient obtains a gross utility that varies within the
population, due to individual factors a¤ecting e¢ ciency and secondary e¤ects.
We denote by Vj > 0 the mean utility from the treatment of the therapeutic
class j, and capture the dispersion of side e¤ects by a parameter . Each patient
receives Vj+exij ; where exij is is a random variable identically and independently
distributed across consumers and drugs, with a uniform distribution on the
interval [  12 ; 12 ]. Therefore, the patient is net utility is given by
Vj + exij   p+R
where p is the price paid and R is the reimbursement received.11 We can view
the ex-ante value of a medication Vj as the reference value. Since doctors are
able to identify the utility component exij the ex-post value is Vj + exij which
di¤ers from the reference value by a random term exij :
Denote by v = V2   V1 the quality di¤erential between classes. We assume
that v is substantially larger than .
Assumption 1  << v:
From the previous assumptions, we can derive the following demands for
drugs under the regime where all drugs are 100% covered:
1. Only drugs in the highest level available are consumed.12
2. The total demand for drugs is equal to 1:
3. The demand is evenly spread between all the drugs in the same level of
the therapeutic class.
Drugs are produced at zero costs. In the regime without reference pricing,
producers are just setting regulated prices. Assumption 1 implies that when a
drug is introduced in level N , producers of level C have no sales.
2.2 Price regulation
When a new drug is introduced in the market, an introductory price is set by
negotiation between the regulator and the laboratory who produces the new
molecule.13
10See Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for a presentation of discrete choice models.
11We do not include the payment for tax and insurance premium, that are independent of
consumption (at the individual level).
12 Indeed, consuming in class 2 and incurring the highest disutility is better than consuming
in class 1 and incurring the smallest disutility.
13The bargaining model developed in this paper has been realized after various interviews,
especially with the CEPSs director and some personals of the French Protection Social Min-
istry.
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The negotiation is depicted by the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution,
with arbitrary bargaining power,  > 0 for the regulator and 1  for the rm,
where the status-quo corresponds to not introducing the new drug. This can be
viewed as a bargaining process a la Rubinstein with di¤erent discount factors for
the regulator and the rm. The negotiators only care about current consumers
surplus for the regulator and current prots for the rm. Assuming that the
rms negotiators are maximizing short run prot instead of the discounted
ow of prots is admittedly a shortcoming, although we believe this is a good
approximation of reality. We discuss the case where rms are far-sighted in
section 8.
The negotiated price maximizes the function:
[W (with innovation) W (without innovation)]
 [(with innovation)  (without innovation)]1 
where W is the welfare as perceived by the regulator, and  represents the
instantaneous prot generated by the sales of the drug. It is worth notic-
ing that the R&D expenses are sunk for all agents at the time of marketing.
Therefore, they are not taken into account in the bargaining process. Here-
after, we assume that if the negotiation fails, the rm has no way to mar-
ket its innovation anywhere so that it is as if it had no innovation at all and
(without innovation) = 0.14
We distinguish two situations. First, when there is no reference pricing, the
introductory price is also the basis of reimbursement: for each drug, expenses
are fully reimbursed to consumers up to this price. When a reference pricing
system is used, each producer still negotiates a price with the regulator, but the
reimbursement rule is changed. If there are two drugs in a therapeutic class,
patients are fully reimbursed of expenses up to the minimal price in the class,
while they bear the full cost above this level.
Even if the French regulator has not adopted a reference pricing system for
therapeutic classes, there is one that is used for some categories of drugs out of
patent protection, the tarif forfaitaire de remboursement. Under this system
the princeps(the patented brand) and all its generics are reimbursed on the
basis of the (administered) price of the generics. The princeps producer can
then decide to lower its price, or to maintain it at its regulated level. We are
not interested in this paper by the generics, but we shall use this type regulation
as our reference pricing system.15
14 It is worth noticing that our negotiation framework can also capture the bargaining process
that occurs in United States between Pharmacy Benet Managers (PBMs) and laboratories.
PBMs are intermediates that negotiate discounts and rebates with manufacturers and sign
agreements with Health Plans. However, the discounts obtained by PBMs may also depend
on quantity, which is not the case in our framework.
15As pointed out by a referee, it is worth noticing that the second drug can be interpreted as
a generic if  captures di¤erences in patientsattitude toward them. Nevertheless, implications
in terms of R&D and entry would be di¤erent.
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2.3 The R&D sector
The upstream part of the sector is composed of laboratories under the super-
vision of the regulator, whose role at this stage is limited to guarantee drug
safety. There are N (large enough) laboratories active in the research sector of
the pharmaceutical industry for the given pathology. Each laboratory is iden-
tied with a single project.16 We assume that once a rm has innovated, it
obtains a perfect patent of innite duration. At that time, it exits the innova-
tive sector to enter the downstream market where it becomes producer of the
drug at some arbitrary small cost.17
The process of innovation is incremental. When a laboratory innovates, it
can either discover a new product in the same level as existing products (here,
this occurs when there is only one product on the market), or it can discover
a product in the superior level.18 The former will be referred to as horizontal
innovation and the new drug as a follower or a me-too. The latter is referred to
as vertical innovation and the corresponding drug as a pioneer. When investing
in R&D, the laboratory can devote resource to search for a superior quality drug,
or for a drug within the existing therapeutic class. If the current active level
is C, a laboratory investing in the vertical dimension has thus access to level
N . The pharmaceutical laboratories being far sighted, they anticipate correctly
their future stream of income, and base their decisions on discounted prots,
with a discount factor r.
In what follows, we assume that at date zero there is one drug in level C:We
then distinguish two cases, one where follower innovation can occur only in level
N , and one where it can occur in both levels levels C and in level N .
As regards the innovation process,19 we adopt a deterministic innovation
model according to which laboratories choose the time devoted to develop the
new product. This time is known in advance and the development cost is a
decreasing function of the discovery time. By this, we mean that, ceteris paribus,
a laboratory has to provide more costly e¤orts if it wants to reduce the duration
of the investigation process. Formally, the cost of bringing a vertical innovation
to the market is
C(t) = Ce t
16This assumption is here to avoid the problem of the management of projects and products
portfolio. It also reects the opinion among specialists that innovation by independent research
unit is becoming standard in the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, this assumption makes
sense when considering a single pathology (see the conclusion).
17Another possibility is that the laboratory sells the patented innovation to a single pro-
ducer. See Aghion and Tirole (1994) for opening the black box of innovation in an incomplete
contracts framework.
18We implicitly assume that ex ante, laboratories know what type of innovation they will
obtain. In practice there is a large uncertainty on the nal output of R&D; but the distinction
between major innovation and minor incremental innovation is key for the industry. See
Berndt, Cockburn and Grepin (2006) or Dranove and Metzler (1994).
19A description of the innovation process can be found in DiMasi, Hansen, Grabowski and
Lasagna (1995) and DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski (2003).
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where t is the time length of the research process. We consider the regular case
where  > r:
Investment cost is paid up-front so that the discounted prot of the rm
investing at date  is e r ( C (t) + e rt+t) where +t is the expected
discounted ow of prot obtained on the retail market following the introduction
of the drug at date  + t.
Similarly, starting the process after the introduction of the rst drug in a
given level, the discovery of a new drug in the same level (horizontal innovation)
has a cost
c(t) = ce t
with c < C. The discounted prot is then e r ( c (t) + e rt+t) :
We consider a free-entry equilibrium on the innovation market where invest-
ment is publicly observable and a rms objective is discounted prot. Therefore,
an equilibrium can be dened as follows:
i) no rm investing obtains a negative prot;
ii) there is no opportunity for a non investing rm to enter with positive
prot.
At the competitive equilibrium three properties hold. First, the research
projects start just after a new level is created. Second, the time chosen for
any active research project is the time that cancels the prot of the investor.
Third, if no laboratory invests in horizontal innovation, the prot from doing
so is non-positive.
3 The retail market
We denote by i = 1 and 2 the rst and the second drugs introduced in level j
and by p1j and p
2
j the price at which they are introduced.
When there is no reference pricing, consumers are fully reimbursed. Thus
demand is price-inelastic. The optimal price for producers is then the adminis-
trated price that has been negotiated for their product. In particular the entry
of a competing drug in the therapeutic class has no impact on the price of the
existing drug, but a¤ect the sales. With two drugs in the class sales are evenly
shared.
Under the reference pricing system, things are di¤erent only when there
are two drugs in the same class j: Indeed once the new drug is introduced the
producer of the pre-existing drug may decide to maintain its price or to reduce
it.20 Let p1j and p
2
j be the regulated prices of the two drugs, and assume that
p1j  p2j (we show below that this is indeed the case). First note that no price
will be set below p2j ; since below this level demand is price insensitive. Thus
the only question is the choice of price by the producer of drug 1: For any price
p between p2j and p
1
j ; its demand is Prob
ex1j   ex2j   p  p2j =	 since patients
pay p  p2j to acquire the drug 1: It is 1=2 if it chooses to align its price to p2j :
20We could also assume that the only choice is between the negotiated price and the reference
price, which would strengthen our results.
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Lemma 1 If p1j > p
2
j > =2, then under reference pricing the producer of the
pioneer drug 1 aligns its price with the reference price p2j .
Proof. See appendix.
This strategy whereby laboratories choose to align their prices with the ref-
erence price is quite common21 even if, in practice, it may depend on reference
pricing modalities. For instance, this result is in line with Danzon and Liu (1996)
and Danzon and Ketchman (2004) who validate the convergence hypothesis
to the reference price within a therapeutic class. As pointed out by Lopez-
Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000), in Italy laboratories have now agreed to
cut prices, to avoid delisting. These authors argue that in Sweden, drugs prices
also drop to the reference pricing level.22
3.1 Price negotiation without reference pricing
The welfare function is given by the aggregate utility of consumers net of the so-
cial cost of health expenditures. With a single drug in the highest level available,
all patients consume the same drug and we write welfare as
W = Vj   p1j :
This welfare function reects the current concern for health expenditures, and
summarizes the impact of budget considerations in the behavior of the regulator.
In this objective we assume no distortionary e¤ect of taxation. We could account
for a social cost  of public funds by using a welfare function Vj   (1 + ) p1j .23
However, because consumers will always be fully reimbursed, this is formally
equivalent in our model to renormalizing utility and prices by dividing them by
the factor 1+:We thus interpret the utility and the prices as being normalized
in unit of public funds.24
When there are two drugs in the highest level j, consumers are spread
between the two drugs and the social value is the expectation of the high-
est value of treatment Vj + maxfex1j ; ex2jg minus the social cost. Using 1=6 =
E
 
maxfex1j ; ex2jg, we obtain
W = Vj +

6
  1
2
(p1j + p
2
j ):
Introductory prices can be determined sequentially, as the function of the
introductory prices of previous drugs. The outcome of negotiation depends on
the actual state of the markets (drugs on the markets and prices) and on the
21See Brekke et al (2006).
22We should point that leading brands do not always choose to align. This could be ex-
plained by several factors as demand inertia, the fact that some countries determine prices
through an external reference pricing mechanism, or the threat of parallel import.
23See La¤ont-Tirole (1993) for a discussion of the concept of the social cost of public funds.
24Formally, if  > 0; the Lemma 1 should be modied to p1j > p
2
j >  (1 + ) =2:
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nature of the innovation (vertical or horizontal). There are three possible cases,
when the current level is j.
Let us rst consider the case of the introduction of a follower, in an existing
level. There is a drug i = 1 in the level j at price p1j (with j = C or j = N),
and the innovator introduces another drug i = 2 in the same level. The new
drug reaches half of the patients. The regulators gain from the introduction at
price p2j of the new drug is =6 + (p
1
j   p2j )=2 where the rst term represents
the increase in therapeutic value, while the second captures the cost saving
accounting for the fact that half of the population pays the new price.25 The
prot from introduction is p2j=2. We thus solve the program
max
p2j


6
+
1
2
(p1j   p2j )
 p2j
2
!1 
which yields a price
p2j = (1  ) [p1j +

3
]: (1)
We see that p2j < p
1
j whenever  is small. When the bargaining power of
the regulator is high enough or the new drug has little value added, horizontal
innovation leads to a reduction in health expenditure. In practice, the conditions
of introduction of me-toos depend on the quality improvement provided by me-
toos. Nevertheless, various studies, such as the Arzneiverordnugs Report (2005)
in Germany or DiMasi (2000) reveal that me-toos drugs usually imply high
discounts relative to price leader.
Consider now the introduction of a new drug at the superior level (pioneer).
The new price depends on the prevailing situation on the market. Let paC be the
average price in the level C, and VC + 
a
C be the average utility in level C prior
to the introduction of the new drug. Thus aC is the mean value of individual
e¤ects. When there is only one drug in level C, then paC = p
1
C and 
a
C = 0; while
with two drugs we have paC =
 
p1C + p
2
C

=2 and aC = =6.
The gain in therapeutic value from introduction is v   aC since all patients
switch to the new drug, which replaces the old one(s). So the negotiated price
is the solution of
max
p1N
 
v   aC   (p1N   paC)
  
p1N
1 
:
The price of the new drug is:
p1N = (1  ) [paC + v   aC ] : (2)
This deserve several comments. First, given that v > , when there is only
one drug in level C, the innovation to the superior level leads to an introduc-
tory price p1N larger than the introductory price p
2
C that would prevail for an
25Given that demand is not sensitive to price, there is no incentives for the seller of the
existing drug to reduce its price when an entry occurs.
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horizontal innovation. Thus a vertical innovation generates higher prices than
an horizontal innovation. Second, since p2C < p
1
C + =3, the price of the pioneer
is smaller when there has been a follower in the level C. There are indeed two
e¤ects at work. First, horizontal innovation reduces health expenditures in the
previous therapeutic class, forcing vertical innovators to negotiate lower price.
Second, the larger value in the level C due to diversity reduces the gain in terms
of therapeutic value brought by the vertical innovation, again calling for lower
prices.
Overall it is easy to verify that under assumptions 1 and 2; the introduction
of the pioneer raises the average price, while the introduction of a follower
reduces it. Thus, for given delays of introduction, ceteris paribus, horizontal
innovation reduces health expenditures, while vertical innovation raises them.
3.2 Bilateral negotiation under reference pricing
We maintain the assumption on the bilateral bargaining process between the
producer of the new drug and the regulator. Two points are worth noticing.
Despite the fact that the producers of existing drugs are directly a¤ected by
the price negotiated for new drugs (since their drug reimbursement level is
a¤ected), these producers are not part of the negotiation process. Moreover,
the bargaining weights  and 1   ; are not a¤ected by the change in the
bargaining environment.
In this case we denote by P ij the negotiated prices instead of p
i
j (prices
without reference pricing): First, notice that the behavior of negotiators when
the level N pioneer drug is introduced remains unchanged, compared to before,
since reference pricing is irrelevant when there is a single drug within the class:
P 1N = (1 ) [P aC + v   aC ]. The main di¤erence with the base regime is when a
new drug is introduced in an existing level (follower). In this case the regulator
anticipates that negotiating an introductory price with the follower that is below
the price of the pioneer will induce the producer of the latter to align its price,
as shown in Lemma 1. Thus the solution of the bargaining game is given by
max
P 2j P 1j

1
6
 + P 1j   P 2j
 P 2j
2
!1 
;
which yields the price
P 2j = (1  )

P 1j +

6

: (3)
The corresponding price P 2j is strictly smaller than P
1
j under assumptions 1 and
2: Comparing with above we obtain that
Lemma 2 For a given introductory price of the pioneer, a follower is introduced
at a smaller price with reference pricing than without.
Proof. Follows from P 2j < (1  ) [P 1j + =3].
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The reason is that the marginal benet for the regulator of reducing the
price is higher because the price reduction applies to all the drugs in the class.
The regulator is thus a tougher negotiator.
4 The dynamics of innovation within a class
In all that we assume that at date zero there is one drug in level C and we take
p1C as given by history: p
1
C = P . For consistency we impose two conditions on
P :
Assumption 2  << P < 1  v:
The rst condition follows from assumption 1 with the same interpretation.
The second comes from the presumption that P is the result of past innovation.
More precisely, it constitutes a level of reference for the price that can be nego-
tiated for sequence of pioneer innovations of incremental values v. Notice that
the assumption implies that the condition of lemma 1 holds.
We rst consider the impact of reference pricing when innovation is not
possible in level C (no me-too in level C). This allows to focus on the impact
of the regulatory regime on the creation and the within dynamics of a new
therapeutic class, here the level N: We leave to section 5 the analysis of the
long run impact of the regulatory regimes, accounting for level C innovation.
4.1 The dynamics of innovation without reference pricing
Knowing the prices that will be set at the marketing stages, we can now solve
the innovation game. Since the cost of a vertical innovation goes to zero as-
ymptotically, in any equilibrium, all levels will be discovered at some points in
time. Moreover introductory prices have been determined above. Thus, when
looking at the dynamics of innovation, the questions concern the delays before
the occurrence of the pioneer and the follower innovations in level N .
In the absence of reference pricing, the introductory prices will be p1N and
p2N given by the price equations 1 and 2, with p
a
C = P and 
a
C = 0. The pioneer
is introduced after a delay tN and the follower after an extra delay N ; thus at
tN + N :We assume the following condition that ensures that the drugs will be
introduced after some delays, N > 0; tN > 0 :
Assumption 3 c > (1 )(P+v)2r and C >
(1 )(P+v)
r :
Let us now consider innovation delays by backward induction. When the
pioneer is introduced, the research focuses on the follower with an investment
such that the discounted benets are null, that is the delay N from introduc-
ing the second drug is solution of ce N =
 
e rN p2N

=2r, which yields an
introductory delay
N =
1
   r

ln (c)  ln

p2N
2r

: (4)
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Consider now the pioneer. In equilibrium, a pioneer enjoys monopoly sales
for a period of length N following its introduction, and serves half of the market
afterward. The expected prot is thus p
1
N
r

1  e rN2

: Anticipating the entry
of the follower, the competitive laboratory providing a pioneer chooses a delay
tN solution of
Ce tN = e rtN
p1N
r

1  e
 rN
2

:
Using equations (4) and (1), we obtain
tN =
1
   r

lnC   ln

(p1N )
r

; (5)
where the function  is dened as
(p) = p 
 
(1  ) [p+ 3 ]
2cr
! r
 r
p
2
:
This last function summarizes the e¤ects of the introductory price on the
pioneers protability, accounting for the e¤ect on the me-too introductory delay.
Reducing the price depresses the margin obtained by the producers, but it also
reduces the price of the me-too. This reduction of the me-toos price delays its
introduction, thus raises the length of the period during which the innovator is
a monopoly. The overall e¤ect on prots is ambiguous. Nevertheless we obtain:
Lemma 3 If  > 2r; then  (p) is increasing.
Proof. See appendix.
In other words, the direct e¤ect of the price on the prot margin dominates
if the innovation cost declines fast enough.
4.2 Innovation under a reference pricing regulation
Let us now consider the case with reference pricing. The di¤erence with the
above is two-fold. First negotiated prices are di¤erent. Second the pioneer
reduces and aligns its price at the introduction of the follower (cf. Lemma 1).
Introducing reference pricing under our assumption does not change the price
of the pioneer: P 1N = p
1
N as we consider in this section level C drug prices as
exogenous and identical under both regulatory regimes. On the contrary, for
the follower the price changes to (using the price equation 3):
P 2N = (1  ) [P 1N +

6
] = p2N   (1  )

6
:
Under reference pricing, denote &N the introductory delay of the follower
and TN the delay of introduction of the pioneer. The delay for the follower in
the level N is given by
&N =
1
   r

ln (c)  ln

P 2N
2r

: (6)
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The introductory delay of the pioneer is now given by (with similar notations
as above)
TN =
1
   r
 
ln (C)  ln
"

 
P 1N

r
#!
(7)
where
 (p) =
 
1  e r&N  p+ 1
2
e r&N (1  ) [p+ 
6
]
 (p) represents the average ow prot for the pioneer under reference pricing
accounting for the new delay of introduction and the new price of the follower.
Lemma 4 If (1  ) > 2r; then  (p) is increasing.
Proof. See appendix.
This last function is similar to  (:) in the the regime without reference
pricing and is detailed in appendix. The di¤erence is that after delay &N the
pioneer not only looses half of the market but its price is reduced to P 2N . For this
reason, the condition to ensure that  (p) increases with p is more restrictive
than for  (:) and depends on the regulators bargaining power: if  is low
enough, the protability of the pioneer increases with its price. The e¤ect of the
duration of the monopoly period is stronger because, with reference pricing, the
pioneer is forced to reduce its prot margin at the introduction of the me-too
(Lemma 1).
Proposition 1 In terms of delays of introduction, the consequences of the ref-
erence pricing are:
 The me-too is delayed i.e. &N > N :
 The pioneer is delayed i.e. TN > tN if and only if P is above some
threshold.
Proof. See appendix.
Under the reference pricing regime, the regulator sets lower prices for the me-
too and the introduction of me-toos is delayed compared with the case without
reference pricing. The e¤ect on the innovation delay of the pioneer is more
ambiguous. Indeed, adopting reference pricing generates two conicting e¤ects
on the protability of the pioneer. For one thing, the pioneer drug benets from
a longer period of monopoly. But when the me-too is introduced, it supports a
larger prot loss as its price is aligned. The overall impact is ambiguous. For
a given price P in level C, the two regulation regimes lead to the same price
for the pioneer of level N , i.e. P 1N = p
1
N . Because the marginal e¤ect of the
introductory price on prot is stronger under no reference pricing than under
a reference pricing regulation, the protability of the pioneer introduction is
higher under no reference pricing for high values of p1N , thus for high values of
P:
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Corollary 1 It is more likely that reference pricing delays pioneer innovation
if the incremental value v is large, the incremental value of the me-too is small
( small), the rms are patient (r small). The e¤ect of the bargaining power 
is ambiguous.
Proof. See appendix.
The condition on v resumes exactly the same intuition as the condition on
P in Proposition 1. If v is high enough, ceteris paribus, the negotiated price
of the pioneer in level N will be high too, generating a higher protability
under no reference pricing than under reference pricing. Moreover, under a
reference pricing regime, when the incremental value of the me-too is small,
the follower negotiates a low price with the regulator. This low price being
applied to both drugs in the class, it decreases the protability of the pioneer
when it looses its monopoly position. This reduction of the pioneers protability
delays its introduction in comparison with no reference pricing. Notice that for
small di¤erentiation ( small), both the pioneer and the follower innovations are
delayed by the introduction of reference pricing.
5 The long run e¤ect of reference pricing
In section 4, the level C was taken exogenously and we could focus on the impact
of the regulatory regime on the level Ns characteristics i.e. levels of prices
and delays of introduction. Nevertheless, the choice of the regulatory regime
generates more complex e¤ects since it inuences innovation in the current class
as well as in future classes. To study this issue we now allow innovation to occur
in level C (prior to the discovery of the rst level N drug). The new question is
thus whether or not there is an horizontal innovation in level C. This leads to
distinguish two types of equilibria, corresponding to two di¤erent sequences of
innovation.
In the rst possible sequence of innovations, the follower in level C is never
introduced. We will refer to such a situation as involving a short sequenceas
less drugs appear and the second level appears faster than in the second type
of equilibrium. In the second possible type of equilibrium, the follower of level
C is introduced before the pioneer of level C. We will refer to this as involving
a long sequence.
5.1 Innovation without reference pricing
In what follows we use symbol k 2 fs; lg to denote the two types of equilibrium,
where s and l stands respectively for short and for long. We denote C(k) and
N (k) the delay of introduction of the follower in the sequence k in levels C
and N , when this introduction occurs in equilibrium, and tN (k) the delay of
apparition of the level N pioneer. Finally pij (k) represents the introductory
price of the drug i in level j corresponding to a sequence k. Notice that in level
C; the research on the follower and the research on the pioneer both start at
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date zero. Indeed the rm planning to introduce the next pioneer benets from
starting the research process immediately instead of waiting for the follower to
emerge, since this minimizes the introductory delay and the follower does not
generate R&D spillover. Thus the follower is introduced at date C (l) in the
long sequence, the next level at date tN (k) and the last drug (the me-too in the
level j = N) at date tN (k) + N (k).
For any sequence, the introductory prices are independent of introductory
dates, but it is worth noticing that the introductory price of the pioneer depends
on the sequence of innovations:
p1N (s) = (1  ) [P + v] ;
p1N (l) = (1  )

P + p2C (l)
2
+ v   
6

:
To characterize equilibria, we follow the same reasoning as in the previous
section. We provide the formal derivation in appendix and summarize here the
intuitions and the results.
For each sequence, we can compute the equilibrium choices of introduc-
tory delays tN (k) and N (k) using equations (5) and (4) for respective prices
p1N (k) and p
2
N (k) : The question that remains is whether the equilibrium is of
type k = s or of type k = l: The answer depends obviously on the incentives to
introduce a follower in level C. Notice that the prot from introducing a follower
in level C when the pioneer is planned to arrive at tN is:26
max
tN

p2C (l)
2r
 
e r   e rtN   ce  ;
which increases with the delay tN . This value of innovation in level C is positive
if the pioneer is introduced after some critical lapse of time t: Thus it is protable
to introduce a follower in level C if and only if tN  t: It follows that an
equilibrium with a short sequence exists if and only if tN (s)  t: Indeed, only
in this case, no innovator will choose to invest in a follower in level C:
Similarly an equilibrium with a long sequence exists if and only if tN (l) 
t: In this case we can then compute the introductory delay C (l) < tN (l) which
cancels the prot.
To characterize equilibria, we thus need to compare tN (s) ; tN (l) and t:
Given that p1N (s) > p
1
N (l) ; the pioneer emerges faster when its introductory
price increases if  (p) is increasing with respect to p (Lemma 3). We can then
conclude:
Proposition 2 There exists a threshold t such that an equilibrium with a short
sequence exists if and only if tN (s)  t, and an equilibrium with a long sequence
exists if and only if tN (l)  t: For  > 2r; tN (s) < tN (l) and an equilibrium
exists.
26An innovation would allow to sell 1=2 at price p2C (l) as long as the pioneer in level N is
not introduced. Note that the price corresponds to the long sequence as it is conditioned on
the entry of the follower in level C:
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Proof. See appendix.
Notice that in the case where tN (s)  t  tN (l), both sequences can emerge
in equilibrium. The situation where  > 2r is illustrated in gure 1 which
represents the threshold t and the delays tN (s) and tN (l) as a function of the
parameter C. When the pioneer innovation is not costly, only the short sequence
emerges, while for high C only the long sequence occurs. For intermediate values
the two sequences can emerge as equilibria.
Figure 1: Introductory delays
Considering the impact of various parameters on the type of equilibrium we
nd that
Corollary 2 For both sequences s and l; the sequence short is less likely (t  
tN (k) decreases) when C increases or  increases. The same is true when v
decreases if  > 2r:
Proof. See appendix.
As expected, increasing the value of vertical innovations also raises the like-
lihood to see such innovations on the market. Intuitively, increasing the inno-
vative content v of vertical innovations should tend to favor a short sequence,
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with less me-too introductions. The reason is that me-too have shorter prospect
for existence. However it is worth noticing that the opposite counter-intuitive
e¤ect could arise if  (p) is decreasing on some range.
The impact of the bargaining power on the dynamics is more complex. In-
creasing  reduces the prices and delays the follower in level N . In the sequence
s, the result is to accelerate the introduction of the pioneer. However, when
considering a long sequence, the relative price p1N (l) =p
2
C (l) decreases, which
works in opposite direction.
5.2 Innovation under a reference pricing regulation
Introducing reference pricing changes the price of the level N me-too to
P 2N (k) = (1  )

P 1N (k) +

6

:
The price of the pioneer in each sequence is
P 1N (s) = p
1
N (s) and P
1
N (l) = p
1
N (l) 
 (1  )
2
P
while the level C me-too is introduced at price P 2C (l) = p
2
C (l)   (1  ) =6.
Thus we obtain:
Proposition 3 For a given sequence of innovations, all the prices are smaller
with the reference pricing system than without it.
Proof. Immediate for the level C me-too and the pioneer. For the level N
me-too, this follows from the fact that (3) implies lower prices than (1).
Given the new prices, the derivation of the equilibria is the same as in the
case with no reference pricing except that the introductory delays &N (k) and
TN (k) are given by equations (6) and (7) applied to the relevant price. The e¤ect
of reference pricing on the pioneers prots is ambiguous due to the fact that the
introduction of the follower is delayed, and thus the period of monopoly sales for
the pioneer increases. However direct computation shows that tN (k) < TN (k)
if  is small.
Again which equilibrium emerges depends on the relative position of the
pioneer introductory delay with respect to a threshold.
Proposition 4 There exists a threshold T > t; such that an equilibrium with
a short sequence exists if and only if TN (s)  T , and an equilibrium with
a long sequence exists if TN (l)  T : For c not too small, or for  > 2r1  ,
TN (s) < TN (l) and an equilibrium exists.
Proof. See appendix.
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We see that the conclusions are the same as for propositions 2 and ??, except
that the thresholds take di¤erent values. It is worth noticing that T > t sug-
gesting that reference pricing may facilitate the emergence of a short sequence.
In particular, this is the case if the prot of a pioneer in a short sequence is
larger under reference pricing than under no reference pricing:
Corollary 3 If 
 
p1N (s)
    p1N (s), then the short sequence is an equilib-
rium with reference pricing if it is without.
Proof. Follows from T > t and TN (s)  tN (s) since P 1N (s) = p1N (s) :
A direct computation shows that the prot of the pioneer in the sequence
short is larger with reference pricing than without if 
p1N (s) +

6

(1 + )  3
p1N (s)

 
p1N (s) +

3
p1N (s) +

6
! r
 r
(8)
which occurs for some parameter values. In this case, the increase in the intro-
ductory delay of the me-too is large enough to outweigh the pioneer from the
fact that this introduction will force him to align its price.
Nevertheless for other cases, the reverse condition holds, the prot of the
pioneer decreases, TN (s) > tN (s) and the impact is a priori ambiguous.
For the purpose of illustration, let consider the case where  is close to zero.27
In this case, it is straightforward to see that condition (8) is violated. However,
working directly with equilibrium conditions, we prove in Appendix that the
impact of reference pricing remains stronger for the me-too innovations than for
the pioneer, favouring short sequences.
Corollary 4 Suppose that  is close to zero. The prot of a pioneer is smaller
under reference pricing in both sequences. But if 2=3 > e rN (s), then the short
sequence is an equilibrium with reference pricing if it is without.
Proof. See appendix
To summarize, when the e¤ect on the prot of a pioneer is not too strong,
either because the monopoly period increases, or because this period is long in
any case, the dominant e¤ect of a reference pricing system is the reduction in
the introductory price of the me-toos. In that case, the reference pricing system
tends to crowd-out the horizontal innovation.
6 Welfare and health expenditures
The consumerswelfare is computed using the same discount factor r as the
laboratories. If Ut is the instantaneous consumerssurplus at date t; net of of
27Obviously,  that tends to 0 remains a hypothetical case. Indeed, as pointed out by an
anonymous referee, there is a natural lower limit to . If the di¤erentiation is too low, it would
make sense that the laboratory does not obtain a patent.
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transfers, the intertemporal surplus is dened as
r
Z 1
0
Ute
 rtdt
Due to competition in the R&D sector, there is no prot in any equilibrium,
so that the total surplus coincides with the total consumer surplus. This surplus
is the di¤erence between the intertemporal utility from treatment and the dis-
counted social cost of treatment. If there were no innovation, the intertemporal
welfare would be VC   P:
Let w be the welfare gain in sequence k compared to this benchmark level
VC   P . We can again decompose this gain in two terms: the rst one is
related to the gain in health whereas the second-one captures the variation
in health expenditures. More precisely, if k is the equilibrium sequence, we
have w = h (k)  e (k) ; where h (k) is the aggregate gain in health in sequence
k and e (k) is the increase in discounted health expenditures. The details of
the computations and formulas are given in appendix. For the case where the
regulator uses a reference pricing regulation, and the equilibrium sequence is k0;
we have similarly W = H (k0)  E (k0), where H (k0) and E (k0) have the same
interpretations. It is worth noticing that expenses are modied to account for
the alignment of the pioneers price with the me-toos price.
The introduction by the legislator of a reference pricing regulation has several
potential e¤ects.
First, instantaneous health expenditures are a¤ected through two channels:
- The new price applies to all drugs when an innovation occurs;
- The regulator negotiates di¤erent prices.
Second, the dynamics of innovation is a¤ected in two possible ways :
- Within a sequence, introductory delays change;
- The equilibrium sequence may change, for instance the follower in level
C may be introduced without reference pricing but not with reference
pricing.
When the legislator changes the regulatory regime to reference pricing, health
expenditures are reduced for a xed innovation path, but since the innovation
path changes, the nal impact depends on the e¤ect on innovation. The changes
in the pattern of innovation a¤ects both the health level and the expenses.
It is worth noticing that there may be countervailing e¤ects on expenses due
to di¤erent delays. As seen above, under reasonable assumptions, horizontal
innovations reduces total expenses. Thus a larger delay in the introduction
of followers would be detrimental to expenses, as well as the non-introduction
of some me-toos. The results that precede suggest that reference pricing may
generate such e¤ects, since it raises delays for the follower in level N; and for a
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given date of introduction of the level N pioneer, it also raises the delay for the
follower in level C.
The introductory time of the pioneer in levelN is also a¤ected in a non-trivial
way. Indeed, two conicting e¤ects are involved. On one hand, the protability
of a pioneer is reduced because its price decreases when the follower is intro-
duced. On the other hand, the delay of introduction of the follower increases,
allowing the producer of a pioneer to benet from a longer period of monopoly
situation. The global e¤ect of imposing reference pricing is thus ambiguous, even
when there is no change in the innovation sequence.
The impact on health is also ambiguous. On one hand, for a given sequence,
one can expect reference pricing to have a negative impact on health by delay-
ing innovations. On the other hand, moving from a long sequence to a short
sequence would have an ambiguous e¤ect as there is no introduction of a me-too
in level C while the pioneer arrives after a smaller length of time.
7 Numerical results
In order to obtain more insights on the impact of the change of regime on the
dynamics of innovation and on consumers welfare, we develop some numerical
simulations. We use the market for statins in France as a way to benchmark
some parameters of the model and to get insights on the likely impact of refer-
ence pricing on the dynamics of this type of drugs.28
7.1 The statins
Statins are the most e¤ective drugs to reduce the LDL cholesterol in blood.
In France, the market for statins was born in 1989 with the introduction of
Simvastatin (20 mg). In the following 15 years, new products have been regularly
introduced. In 2004 there were ve available substances, with Simvastatin,
Pravastatin (introduced in 1991), Fluvastatin (introduced in 1996), Atorvastatin
(introduce in 1998) and Rosuvastatin (introduced in 2004). The rst generic
(for Simvastatin) appeared in year 2005, and should be followed by another one
(for Pravastatin) in year 2006. Each substance is now available in 2 to 4 dosages.
These molecules have di¤erent performance levels, in particular in term of
percentage reduction achieved for a given daily dose.29 They also di¤er on the
nature of the secondary e¤ect generated by each molecule, but we do not have
data on this aspect. For a daily dose of 20mg, the mean percentage reduction
in "bad" cholesterol is 32 % for Simvastatin, 24 % for Pravastatin, 21 % for
28We thank Pzer France and Jean-François Guichard for providing the data used thereafter.
29Percentage reduction are derived from Etude BMJ 2003.326.7404.1423 by MR Law, NJ
Wald et AR Rudnicka, Quantifying e¤ect of statins on LDL cholesterol, ischaemic heart
disease and stroke: systematic review and meta-analysis.
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Fluvastatin and 43 % for Atorvastatin. The last drug, Rosuvastatin generates a
reduction of 48 %. Di¤erences are signicant at a 95% condence interval, ex-
cept between Pravastatin and Fluvastatin, and Atorvastatin. and Rosuvastatin.
Similar patterns occur for higher doses (40mg or 80mg).
This shows a clear di¤erence between the rst three molecules and the last
two. Indeed this di¤erence has allowed the producers of Atorvastatin and Rosu-
vastatin to launch products at daily doses of 10mg; while the others stay above
20mg: The corresponding reductions in cholesterol are 37 % and 43 %, above
the level achieved by the others at 20mg.
The expansion in the supply came along with a very rapid growth of statin
consumption. In economic terms, if we add all products together, the sales
value grew at more than 17 % per year over the period, despite regular price
reductions. The average growth rate during the last 4 years, is still at 15 %. Even
the oldest drug (Simvastatin 20mg) continues being sold in growing quantities,
despite the fact that it now su¤ers from the competition of other statins on
the market. In fact there has been an extraordinary growth of the demand for
statins, which beneted to all statins, and which is also the source of an increase
of expenditure for the health care system in France.
In Figure ?? we depict the evolutions of market shares of each molecule. The
market share have dramatically changed over time. Simvastatin, the rst statin
to be introduced, remained leader until 2000 where it lost the rst position
to Pravastatin and Atorvastatin. Fluvastatin has expanded very little, and
Rosuvastatin still has a very short history. For most substances there is a
dosage that appears much more popular than the others and that sells about
twice as much as the second dosage of the same substance.
Prices went down along all the period. Simvastatin 20mg which was rst
sold at 30,05 Euros is sold at 19,34 at the end of the period.30 The other drugs
experimented similar decline (see the table in Figure 3). A particularity of the
market, is that entrants were marketed at prices that were lower than those of
older drugs, even if they were recognized to have a greater e¢ ciency. This is the
case for example of Atorvastatin 10mg which was rst sold at 20,62, and was
then therefore cheaper than the oldest Pravastatin and Simvastatin, although
it is known for generating a greater decrease in cholesterol.
7.2 Simulations
We use the above data to get some insights on relevant parameters. First as
pointed above Fluvastatin had only a marginal impact on the market, and Ro-
suvastatin just emerges. We thus decided to focus on the three main molecules,
Simvastatin, Pravastatin and Atorvastatin. In each molecule some dosage seems
to be determinant, in particular 20mg doses for the rst two are largely dom-
inant. From the above data, we decided to include the rst two molecules in
one level and to classify Atorvastatin as a vertical innovation as dened in our
model.
30Prices are for a four-week treatment.
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Our model has little to say about volumes and in any case demand has been
increasing over time.31 So we use prices as a benchmark. Nevertheless, we face a
di¢ culty because molecules are available at di¤erent doses and we do not know
which is the relevant one. Should we compare Simvastatin 20mg to Atorvastatin
at 10mg which generates similar reductions in cholesterol? Or should we should
compare to Atorvastatin at 20mg which has the same dose of statin? We opted
for the second option.
The second issue relates to the fact that we observe a general trend in de-
creasing prices that is not accounted for in the model. This means that we
cannot directly compare introductory prices. To avoid the issue we choose the
prices of a given year as a benchmark, namely 2004.
The data thus corresponds to a long sequence with an horizontal innovation
in level 1. We have 3 prices available namely 20.75 for Simvastatin, 18.92 for
Pravastatin and 32.76 for Atorvastatin. Prices allow to calibrate the equation of
bargaining between the regulators and the innovator. However for prices, three
parameters matter ; v; : We thus calibrated the last two as a function of
: We present the predicted prices for each possible trajectories for  = 0:2:
Patterns are similar for other values:
 = 0:2 p2C p
1
N p
2
N
no RP 18:92 32:76 28:52
RPseq s   34:65 28:9
RPseq l 17:76 31:10 26:04
Notice that prices are higher under a short sequence, due to the disappear-
ance of the rst innovation.
Delays are more di¢ cult to interpret since in the model we ignore the in-
trinsic randomness of innovation. In the data we have a delay of 9 years for the
vertical innovation, and 2 and 6 years for an horizontal innovation, so an average
of 3 years. In our model ^N < ^C which is not the case in the data. This may
be due to randomness and/or to external e¤ects such as the deationary trend.
We set  = 0:5 and we do not calibrate the costs parameters c and C but rather
check that predicted innovation delays are consistent with observed patterns.
For various values of  we adjust these costs to generate various scenarios. All
our results have pointed to the same conclusions.
We present below the predicted trajectories for various scenarios. We also
computed the discounted consumerssurplus (the term h or H in the surplus)
and the discounted expenses (the term e or E):More precisely, we computed the
change in the benets for consumers and in expenses compared to a situation
with no innovation at all.
We summarize the results below
31Notice that our model can easily accomodate a time trend in demand by adjusting the
discount factor. Indeed increasing demand is formally equivalent to increasing :
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 = 0:2 C or &C tN or TN N or &N health expenses
no RP 4:8 11:4 0:73 20:11 6:13
RP 4:96 11:5 0:93 20:02 4:71
no RP 7:14 9:64 1:13 21:31 6:73
RP NO 9:52 1:1 21:28 7:61
 = 0:4 C or &C tN or TN N or &N health expenses
no RP 5:1 10:76 0:93 39:49 5:58
RP 5:65 10:9 1:36 39:1 3:06
no RP 7:06 10:3 1:78 39:54 5:82
RP NO 10:06 1:86 39:26 7:03
 = 0:6 C or &C tN or TN N or &N health expenses
no RP 4:82 9:91 0:65 79:83 4:98
RP 6:01 10:02 1:32 78:57 1:88
no RP 5:88 9:86 1:22 79:11 5:09
RP NO 9:49 1:52 78:12 6:39
From the simulation we conclude that:
1. The reference pricing system tends to delay innovations. The only case
where this not the case is when the level C innovation disappears and the
pioneer arrives sooner.
2. In all cases, the reference pricing system has a negative impact on health
surplus.
3. The system reduces expenses when the trajectory of innovation is not
a¤ected due to lower prices and delayed innovations.
4. But it raises expenses when some innovation is discouraged.
The global welfare e¤ect will depend on the weight put on expenses relative
to health. In any case it is negative when the trajectory changes.
8 Extensions
We have investigated two specic extensions of the model that we report here.32
One concerns the objective of the pharmaceutical company, the other introduces
some copayments (paid by patients).33 We provide a heuristic discussion dealing
with these two issues. For the discussion that follows, we should have in mind
32We thanks two anonymous referees for suggesting these extensions.
33A technical addendum dealing with the copayment issue is available upon request.
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the following remark. Suppose that the objective of the rms negotiator is
changed from pij to some function p
i
jg
 
pij

: Then a simple revealed preference
argument shows that the negotiated price is unchanged if g (:) is a constant,
while it decreases if g (:) is decreasing, and it increases if g (:) increases.34
8.1 Forward-looking producers
In the negotiation game, we assumed that negotiators are short-sighted. What
happens if the rms negotiator maximizes discounted prot?
Consider the case of the introduction of a follower. Then at the time of the
negotiation, the date of the next pioneer (if any) can be infered by the rm and
is predetermined. The discounted retail prot is then p2j
 
1  e r =2r where
 is the anticipated delay before the next innovation. Because  is exogenous
when the negotiation takes place, the non-myopic negotiator would negotiate
the same price as a myopic negotiator.
Consider the case of the pioneer. In the pharmaceutical industry, there is a
lapse of time between a new innovation is made public, and the negotiation of the
price.35 Thus we may start with the assumption that the R&D investment in
the follower occurs prior to price negotiation. Then in the case without reference
pricing, the non-myopic negotiator would negotiate the same price as a myopic
one. Indeed, at the negotiation stage, the delay of the follower is exogenous and
the prot is proportional to the price. Thus without reference pricing the same
equilibrium emerges irrespective of whether the negotiator is myopic or not.
For the case with reference pricing we need to account for the e¤ect of the
pioneers introductory price on the future reference price. Prot writes as
p:

1  
1   +

1  
1
2
(1  )

1 +

3p

:
Because the right term decreases with p, the non-myopic laboratory would
negotiate lower price than the myopic negotiator. The intuition is that the ref-
erence price is only partially a¤ected by the introductory price of the pioneer.
As the negotiator cares about the mean intertemporal price and not the current
price, he is a softer bargainer.
Overall allowing for a non-myopic negotiator adds a negative e¤ect of ref-
erence pricing on the price of the pioneer, with thus more delays of both the
pioneer and its follower. This would favour long sequences.
An additional e¤ect arises if the price negotiation occurs prior to theR&D investment
in the follower, as negotiators internalize the e¤ect of the introductory price on
the date of introduction of the follower. Negotiated prices would be lower with
and without reference pricing, but we were not able to sign the relative e¤ects
on prots and introductory delays.
34This conclusion is valid for several bargaining games we investigated.
35This is because drugs have to go through several tests and approval stages before their
introduction.
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8.2 Copayment
Assume that there is a small copayment  for the patient. First notice that
nothing is changed for the negotiation of the introductory price of the pioneer
as a small copayment would not a¤ect demand.
In the duopoly case, adapting the proof of lemma 1, we nd that for  small
(compared to P+v+=6), each rm sets its price at its introductory level without
reference pricing,36 and at the reference price with reference pricing. Thus
the relationship between the negotiated prices and the market prices remains
unchanged. However, the consumersallocation when two drugs are avalaible
in the market changes. More precisely, with a copayment, there is a shift of
demand toward the cheapest drug. This implies higher consumerswelfare and
higher prot for the follower, at given prices.
Let us consider the negotiation of the price for a follower without reference
pricing. Compared to a situation in which patients do not have a copayment, one
can show that the welfare is relatively more sensitive to a price reduction. At the
same time, the prot of the follower is relatively less a¤ected by a price reduction
because the increase in demand mitigates the impact of a price reduction. Thus
the introductory prices of followers is lower in the case with no reference pricing.
The same reasoning can be adapted to show that the welfare gain and the short-
run prot of the follower would both be higher with copayment than without.
Another consequence is that the introductory price and the prot would be
lower for the pioneer in a long sequence: indeed the regulator would start with
a higher welfare pre-negotiation, and the next follower is introduced faster.
To sum-up, with a copayment and no reference pricing, prices would be
lower, while a long sequence would be more likely. By contrast, nothing would
be changed in the case with reference pricing because demand is spread evenly
between the two laboratories in the duopoly case.
9 Conclusions
The model emphasizes the interaction between the pricing policy constrained by
various forms of regulation and the e¤ort of innovation by pharmaceutical labo-
ratories. We have identied antagonist e¤ects of the reference pricing regulation:
a decrease in price reduces the incentives to create pioneer drugs; inversely, the
introduction of followers is delayed, which gives positive incentives to launch
pioneers. Consequently, the net e¤ect of the uniform pricing rule within a class
is ambiguous.
Simulations show that the dynamic impact on the health of the population
is negative due to less innovation, while the impact on expenses is ambiguous.
What appears is that by favouring pioneer innovations at the expense of cost
reducing innovations, the regulation may generate a medium/long run increase
in expenses, despite potential short-run benets.
36For jp1   p2j  =; the demand of each rm is positive and equal to Di =
(1  = (pi   pj))2. Otherwise only one rm sells.
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While they need to be conrmed for di¤erent institutional set-ups, the mech-
anisms identied are clear and, in our view, quite robust to institutional details.
Our work also points to a more balanced view on the link between innovation
and expenses. Innovation is a process that contributes both to cost ination
and to cost reduction. While the current heath policy debate has focused on
the control of short run expenses, our analysis points to the fact that much
more attention should be devoted to the role of innovation and its long run
consequences .
Of course much remains done as many issues related to reference pricing
remains.
In our model, we consider that reference pricing only embraces horizontally
di¤erentiated drugs. However, as we mention in the introduction, in some coun-
tries, reference pricing has been applied to vertical innovations as well. It could
be an interesting extension to allow for vertical di¤erences inside a therapeutic
class. Indeed, DiMasi and Paquette (2004) mention the fact that, between 1960
and 1998, approximately one-third of me-toos received a priority rating from
the FDA.
A related topics where our approach should apply is the introduction of
generics at the end of patent protection. Clearly the model can be extended
to x the patent duration and to handle the problem of generic products. One
key issue with generics, is that we do not have a satisfactory theory explaining
the slow di¤usion of generics observed in practice. It crucially depends on
the institutional context and the rents let to actors such that physicians and
pharmacists to operate the substitution between brand-name drugs and generics.
On the innovation side, we have adopted a deterministic innovation model
which ts somewhat the introductory e¤orts of the pharmaceutical rms.37 A
complementary approach would be to account for uncertainty in research and in
particular to analyze the retail market regulation from a risk sharing perspective
where risk is shared between research institutions and society.
37We have also ruled out pharmaceutical groups that develop several drugs and would
internalize the e¤ect of a new drug on the protability of their portfolio. At the level of
therapeutic equivalence class, this seems assumption as groups tend to have only one molecule
in a would-be class.
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A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. Let p be the price of drug 1; where p1j  p  p2j : The
producer of drug 1 chooses to align the price of drug 1 to p2j if
max
p2jpp1j
p:Prob
(ex1j   ex2j  p  p2j
)
=
p2j
2
:
The demand is D1 = 0 for p  p2j + : Using prob
ex1j   ex2j  Z	 = (1 Z)22 for
0  Z  1; the demand is
D1 =
1
2
 
1  p  p
2
j

!2
for p2j  p  p2j + :
We thus the condition:
max
p2jpinffp1j ;p2j+g
p
 
1  p  p
2
j

!2
= p2j :
which holds if  < 2p2j :
Proof of lemma 3. The derivative of (p) is
0(p) = 1  1
2
 
1 +
p
p+ 3

r
   r
! 
(1  ) [p+ 3 ]
c2r
! r
 r
(p) is concave and by assumption 2, for p in the relevant range
0(p) > 1  1
2
 
1 +
p
p+ 3

r
   r
!
>
1
2
p

 2r
 r

+ 3
p+ 3
This is positive for  > 2r for any price.
Proof of lemma 4. The function is
 (p) = p  1
2
 
(1  ) [p+ 6 ]
c2r
! r
 r 
p (1 + )  (1  ) 
6

The derivative of (p) is
0(p) = 1  1
2
 
1 + +
p (1 + )  (1  ) 6
p+ 6

r
   r
! 
(1  ) [p+ 6 ]
c2r
! r
 r
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By assumption 2
0(p) > 1  1
2
 
1 + +
p (1 + )  (1  ) 6
p+ 6

r
   r
!
> (1  ) 1
2


   r
 p1  2r(1 )+ 6
p+ 3
This is positive for (1  )  > 2r for any price.
Proof of Proposition 1 and corollary 1. The rst point follows from
P 2N < p
2
N : For the second point, TN > tN iff 
(1  ) [p1N + 6 ]
c2r
! r
 r 
p1N  
1
2
(1  ) [p1N +

6
]

>
 
(1  ) [p1N + 3 ]
c2r
! r
 r
p1N
2
which writes as
2  (1  ) [1 + 
6p1N
] >
 
1 +
1
6p1N
 + 1]
! r
 r
Moreover, as p1N = (1  ) [P + v], we have
1 +  >

6 [P + v]
+
 
1 +
1
(1 )6[P+v]
 + 1]
! r
 r
Which is true if P is high enough.
The RHS decreases with vand increases with  and r;which implies the results
stated in Corollary 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The level-1 follower is not introduced if
max
<tN (k)
p2C (l)
2r

e r   e rtN (k)

  ce  < 0;
Let us denote  = tN (k)    the length of existence of the drug in level 1 if
introduce at  and dene () = ce
( r)
1 e r : Then the condition of no introduction
can be rewritten writes as
min
[0;tN (k)]
()  p
2
C (l)
2r
e( r)tN (k)
The slope of the function  is 0() = ()

   r1 e r

:  is quasi-convex
with a minimum
 =
c

 r

   rr
r
at  =  
ln(1  r )
r
> 0
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By assumption 2, we have
 >
p2C (l)
2r
e( r):
If tN (k)  ; () >  > p
2
C(l)
2r e
( r) > p
2
C(l)
2r e
( r)tN (k) for all  
tN (k) : Thus there is no introduction. If tN (k) > , there is no introduction if
p2C(l)
2r e
( r)tN (k)  , or if tN (k)  t = 1 r ln
h
2r
p2C(l)
i
. The threshold is then
t =
ln c
   r  
1
   r ln
"
p2C (l)
2

   r

  r
r
#
;
which gives the rst result. An equilibrium exists for all values of t if tN (s) 
tN (l). When  is increasing the results follows from p1N (s) > p
1
N (l).
Proof of corollary 2. For C; this is immediate. For the e¤ect of  we can
write
(   r) (t  tN (s)) = ln
0BBBB@
[P + v]
 
2 

(1 )[(1 )[P+v]+ 3 ]
c2r
 r
 r
!
P + 3
1CCCCA
which decreases with : Then is equal to
(   r) (t  tN (l))
= ln
0BBBB@
  
2 
2

P + v    6
 
2 

(1 )[( 2 2 )P+ v1++ 3 (1 2 )]
c2r
 r
 r
!
P + 3
1CCCCA
is also decreasing with :
When v increases, t is not a¤ected and the price p1N (k) increases, hence the
result for  (:) increasing.
When  increases t   tN (s) increases, while the e¤ect on t   tN (l) is am-
biguous.
Proof of proposition 4. Same as for proposition 2 and ?? with the new
prices. The function  (p) becomes  (p) : The delay for the follower in level N
is given as before while the introductory delay of the pioneer is now given by
TN (k) =
1
   r

ln (C)  ln 1
r


 
P 1N (k)

:
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We nd that
T =
ln c
   r  
1
   r ln
"
P 2C (l)
2

   r

  r
r
#
> t;
where the inequality follows from P 2C (l) < p
2
C (l) :
Proof of corollary 4. For the sequence short we have 
p1N (s)

(1 + )
p1N (s)
= 1 +  >

p1N (s)
p1N (s)
 r
 r
= 1:
This extend to the sequence long, as the price is smaller. Moreover
T   t = 1
   r

ln

p21 (l)
P 21 (l)

TN (k)  tN (k) = 1
   r

ln

(p1N (k))
 (P 12 (k))

Thus T   t > TN (s)   tN (s) i¤ p
2
1(l)
P 21 (l)
>
(p1N (s))
(p1N (s))
. When  = 0; we have
N (s) = &N (s) and the condition writes
P
P
 
1  2
 > " p  2  e rN (s)
p
 
2  e rN (s) (1 + )
#
p=(1 )[P+v]
which reduces to
1 >
3
2
e rN (s);
and gives the condition.
Computations of welfare. In the absence of reference pricing, and when
innovation follows a short sequence, we have
h (s) = e rtN (s)v + e r(tN (s)+N (s))

6
;
e (s) = e rtN (s)
 
p1N (s)  P

+ e r(tN (s)+N (s))(
p2N (s)  p1N (s)
2
)
For a long sequence, we have
h (l) = e rC(l)

6
+ e rtN (l)(v   
6
) + e r(tN (l)+N (l))

6
e (l) = e rC(l)

p2C (l)  P
2

+ e rtN (l)

p1N (l) 
P + p2C (l)
2

+e r(tN (l)+N (l))

p2N (l)  p1N (l)
2

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In the presence of reference pricing, health expenditures are modied due to
the price alignment. Thus we obtain:
E (s) = e rTN (s)
 
P 1N (s)  P

+ e r(TN (s)+&N (s))(P 2N (s)  P 1N (s))
E (l) = e r&C(l)
 
P 2C (l)  P

+ e rTN (l)
 
P 1N (l)  P 2C (l)

+e r(TN (l)+&N (l))
 
P 2N (l)  P 1N (l)

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Figure 2: Market shares for statins
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Figure 3: Statins prices
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